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NOTES 
IRS Denials of Charitable Status: A Social Welfare 
Organization Problem 
INTRODUCTION 
Both charitable and social welfare organizations are exempt from 
federal income taxation. 1 Subsection 501(c)(3) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code (Code) exempts enterprises organized and operated exclu-
sively for charitable purposes,2 and subsection 501(c)(4) exempts 
enterprises operated for the "promotion of social welfare."3 While a 
1. Despite being generally exempt from income taxation, see notes 2-3 infra and accompa-
nying text, charitable and social welfare organizations are still subject to tax on certain "unre-
lated income." "[T)he unrelated business income tax only applies to active business income 
which arises from activities which are 'unrelated' to the organization's exempt purposes. Of 
course, if a substantial portion of an organization's income is from unrelated sources, the or-
ganization will not qualify for exemption in the first instance." B. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 554 (3d ed. 1979) (footnote omitted). See I.R.C. §§ 50l(b), 511-14 
( I 982). See generally B. HOPKINS, supra, at 554-611. 
2. I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (1982). I.R.C. § 50l(a) (1982) grants the income tax exemption to 
subsection 50l(c) organizations. The relevant text of subsection 50l(c)(3) reads: 
(c) List of exempt organizations.-The following organizations are referred to in sub-
section (a) [I.R.C. § 50l(a) (1982)): 
(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and oper-
ated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or 
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition, 
. . . or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of 
which inures to the benefit of any private holder or individual, no substantial part of the 
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legis-
lation ... and which does not parlicipate in, or intervene in, ... any political campaign 
on behalf of any candidate for public office. 
I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (1982). While this provision lists a number of purposes other than charitable 
alone, the Supreme Court recently held that to qualify for tax-exempt status under subsection 
50l(c)(3) an institution must meet "certain common law standards of charity - namely, [the 
institution] must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established public policy." Bob 
Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2026 (1983). Thus, this Note will refer to any 
organization qualifying for tax-exempt status under subsection 501(c)(3) as "charitable." 
The term "exclusively" as used in subsection 50l(c)(3) is interpreted to mean primarily, 
Treas. Reg.§ l.50l(c)(3)-l(c)(l) (1959). See Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 
279, 283 (1945) (holding that a substantial non-exempt purpose will destroy exemption). See 
also B. HOPKINS, supra note I, at 152-57. 
3. I.R.C. § 50l(c)(4) (1982). More specifically, "[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organ-
ized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare" are exempted from 
income taxation by subsection 50l(c)(4) pursuant to I.R.C. § 50l(a) (1982). As with charitable 
organizations,see note 2supra, the term "exclusively" in subsection 50l(c)(4) is interpreted to 
meanprimarily. See People's Educ. Camp Socy. v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1964). 
The term "civic" does not impose a condition in addition to the requirement that an organ-
ization operate for the "promotion of social welfare" to qualify for tax-exempt status under 
subsection 50l(c)(4). See People's Educ. Camp, 331 F.2d at 932-33; Eden Hall Farm v. United 
States, 389 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Treas. Reg.§ l.50l(c)(4)-(a)(2) (1959). But see Erie 
Endowment v. United States, 316 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1963) (denying social welfare status be-
508 
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group may qualify both as a charitable organization and a non-polit-
ical4 social welfare organization, 5 the Internal Revenue Service 
(Service) has denied charitable status to these social welfare organi-
zations in some instances. 6 
cause activity not designed to accomplish community ends); Commissioner v. Lake Forest, 
Inc., 305 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1962) (pointing to dictionary meaning of"civic" and requiring that 
benefits be municipal or public). 
4. To qualify for tax-exempt status, neither charitable nor social welfare organizations may 
participate in political campaigns. Section 50l(c)(3) forbids charitable organizations to "par-
ticipate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political 
campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office." I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (1982). Social wel-
fare organizations are likewise precluded from "direct or indirect participation or intervention 
in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office." Treas. 
Reg. § I.50l(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(ii) (1959). See also Rev. Ru!. 67-368, 1967-2 C.B. 194 (group that 
rated candidates for public office on non-partisan basis denied status as a social welfare organ-
ization). 
The law of trusts more readily accepts as charitable attempts to change existing laws than it 
does support of political parties. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 374 comments j, k 
(1959). Under the Code, however, charitable organizations are much more limited than social 
welfare organizations in their ability to influence legislation. To qualify as charitable, an or-
ganization must not be engaged in "carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influ-
ence legislation" as a "substantial part" of its activities. I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (1982); Treas. Reg. 
§ l.50l(c)(3)-l(c)(3) (1959); see also Rev. Ru!. 67-293, 1967-2 C.B. 185 (social welfare organi-
zation denied status as charitable because of its legislative activities); B. HOPKINS, supra note 1, 
at 256-59. This proscription on legislative activities is subject to certain exceptions. See I.R.C. 
§ 50l(h) (1982). A social welfare organization, on the other hand, may attempt to influence 
legislation. Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(3)-(l)(b)(ii), (iv), (v) (1959). Such social welfare organiza-
tions are known as "action organizations." See Treas. Reg.§§ l.50l(c)(3)-l(c)(3), l.50l(c)(4)-
l(a)(2)(ii) (1959). 
Unless otherwise indicated, the term "social welfare organization" as used in this Note 
does not refer to an action organization. For a further discussion on politically active social 
welfare organizations, see notes 84-87 i,ifra and accompanying text. 
5. An organization may qualify both as charitable under subsection 501(c)(3) and as social 
welfare under subsection 501(c)(4). See Treas. Reg. § l.501(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(i) (1959); Rev. Ru!. 
74-361, 1974-2 C.B. 159. In fact, the Treasury Regulations define the terms "charitable" and 
"social welfare" by reference to each other. "Charitable" is defined by the regulations as 
follows: 
The term "charitable" is used in section 50l(c)(3) in its generally accepted legal sense 
and is, therefore, not to be construed as limited by the separate enumeration in section 
50 l(c)(3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may fall within the broad outlines of "char-
ity" as developed by judicial decisions. Such terms include: Relief of the poor and dis-
tressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement of education or 
science; erection or maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of 
the burdens of Government; and promotion if social we(fare by organizations designed to 
accomplish any of the above purposes, or (i) to lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to elimi-
nate prejudice and discrimination; (iii) to defend human and civil rights secured by law; 
or (iv) to combat community deterioration and juvenile delinquency. 
Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (1959) (emphasis added). Treas. Reg. § l.501(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(i) 
( 1959) prescribes that a " 'social welfare' organization will qualify for exemption if it falls 
within the [above] definition of 'charitable'." 
6. The Service has not treated the categories of charitable organizations and social welfare 
organizations as coextensive. Revenue rulings provide examples of instances where the Service 
has approved social welfare status while denying charitable status. See, e.g., Rev. Ru!. 70-4, 
1970-1 C.B. 126; Rev. Ru!. 66-179, 1966-1 C.B. 139; Rev. Ru!. 59-310, 1959-2 C.B. 146 (quoted 
at note IO i,ifra ). 
Revenue rulings are cited throughout this Note as evidence of the Service's interpretation 
of the Code. According to Rev. Proc. 78-24, 1978-2 C.B. 503, reliance on rulings is proper. 
This revenue procedure defines a "revenue ruling" as "an official interpretation of the Internal 
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The distinction drawn by the Service between charitable and so-
cial welfare organizations is significant because the tax law grants 
benefits to charitable organizations that do not apply to other 
groups.7 The most valuable of these benefits is the deductibility for 
income tax purposes of donations to charitable organizations. 8 The 
Service has refused to extend this deduction to donations made to 
social welfare organizations.9 This refusal seems inconsistent, how-
ever, with the position taken by some courts that social welfare orga-
Revenue laws ... and regulations, by the Internal Revenue Service ... issued only by the 
National Office and ... published for the information and guidance of taxpayers, Service 
officials and others concerned." 1978-2 C.B. at 505. Furthermore, this revenue procedure 
states: "Revenue rulings do not have the force and effect of Treasury Department Regulations 
. . . but are published to provide precedents to be used in the disposition of other cases, and 
may be cited and relied on for that purpose." 1978-2 C.B. at 505. 
In one of the revenue rulings cited above, the Service conferred social welfare status on an 
organization formed to "[promote] the health of the general public by encouraging all persons 
to improve their physical condition and of fostering by educational means public interest in a 
particular sport for amateurs" of all ages. Rev. Ru!. 70-4, 1970-1 C.B. 126, 126. The Service 
however, denied charitable status for the organization. In Rev. Ru!. 66-179, 1966-1 C.B. 139, 
the Service ruled on the status of four garden clubs; two of the determinations are relevant for 
purposes of this Note. One garden club was formed to instruct the public about horticulture 
and to stimulate beautification of the area, and its activities were consistent with those pur-
poses. Its membership was open to the public. A second garden club was identical to the first 
except that a "substantial part of the organization's activities, but not its primary activity, 
consist[ed] of social functions for the benefit, pleasure, and recreation of its members." 1966-1 
C.B. at 140. The Service distinguished the two clubs on the basis of these social functions. The 
first was judged charitable; the second was limited to social welfare status. 
Congress recognized that charitable organizations can qualify as social welfare organiza-
tions and passed l.R.C. § 504 (1982) to prevent abuses of that option by charitable organiza-
tions that become politically active. See S. REP. No. 938 (Pt. II), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 83, 
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4030, 4107-08. 
7. For example, l.R.C. §§ 312l(b)(8)(B) and 3306(c)(8) (1982) exempt charitable organiza-
tions from certain employment tax obligations. 
8. Contributions to charitable organizations are deductible in computing the donor's in-
come tax under I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) (1982). Cf. l.R.C. §§ 2055(a)(2), 2106(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1982) 
(corresponding estate tax provisions); I.R.C. § 2522(a)(2), (b)(2)-(3) (1982) (corresponding gift 
tax provisions). Contributions to social welfare organizations, on the other hand, are not de-
ductible. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (1982); see also Regan v. Taxation with Rep., 103 S. Ct. 1997, 
2000 (1983); B. HOPKINS, supra note I, at 256; Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit 
Organizations from Federal Income Tax, 85 YALE L.J. 299,347 (1976). 
Eligibility for deductible contributions is advantageous to an organization because (in the-
ory) it enables the organization to attract both a greater number of contributions and larger 
contributions. The effective after-tax cost to the donor of deductible contributions is the gross 
dollar amount discounted by a coefficient equal to the difference between one and the donor's 
marginal tax rate. Non-deductible contributions of an equal dollar amount are not discounted 
and thus are more expensive to the donor. See Taxation with Rep. v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 718 
(D.C. Cir. 1982),revd. on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983); Abortion Rights Mobilization, 
Inc. V. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION ~ 7.01, at 142 (3d ed. 1982). The charitable organization stands to benefit in two 
ways. First, if a donor has decided to give to an organization that happens to be charitable, 
presumably he will give more to the organization than he would if it were not charitable be-
cause the effective after-tax cost of the contribution would be less than the nominal amount of 
the contribution. Second, where a donor is otherwise indifferent as to which of two organiza-
tions to contribute to, an organization's charitable status would sway the donor in its favor. 
See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 729-30 (1974). 
9. See Rev. Ru!. 59-310, 1959-2 C.B. 146 (discussed at note 10 i'!fra). 
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nizations serve the same purposes as charitable organizations and 
therefore should be treated similarly under the tax law. 10 
This Note argues that the courts and the Service should recognize 
social welfare organizations as charitable and, consequently, contri-
butions to such organizations should be tax deductible. Part I de-
scribes the Service's position and sets forth the statutory arguments 
supporting it. Part II raises two objections to the Service's position: 
(1) the distinction between social welfare organizations and charita-
ble organizations lacks an adequate statutory justification, and (2) 
this distinction produces unpredictable and arbitrary results. Pa~ III 
10. See Consumer Credit Counseling Serv., Inc. v. United States, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ~ 9660 (D.D.C. 1978); Monterey Pub. Parking Corp. v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 972 
(N.D. Cal. 1970), offd., .481 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1973); Northern Cal. Cent. Serv. v. United 
States, 591 F.2d 620, 626 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Peters v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 55 (1953); Turnure v. 
Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 871 (1927). 
In Monterey, a group of private businessmen formed a nonprofit corporation to build and 
operate a public parking lot because the local government could not afford to support the 
project. The Service contended that the corporation was neither a charitable nor a social wel-
fare organization, advancing separate grounds for each contention. The Service asserted that 
charitable status was improper because more than an "insubstantial" part of the organization's 
acts was not in furtherance of an exempt purpose. The Service argued that social welfare 
status should be denied because the corporation carried on a business similar to that of an 
enterprise operated for profit. The court rejected these tests and held that the organization 
qualified under both the charitable and social welfare exemption provisions. In so holding, the 
court expressly disagreed with the Service's distinction between social welfare organizations 
and charitable organizations, observing that "the distinction between the two subsections of 
§ 501 is more apparent than real." 321 F. Supp. at 975. The court further noted that both 
provisions and their accompanying regulations serve the same policy: 
In short, the Regulations aim at discovering whether asserted civic or charitable ends are 
but subterfuges for what is fundamentally a private enterprise. If they are not, the case 
law under both subsections has made it clear that they will not destroy the exemption 
claimed. 
321 F. Supp. at 975 (citation omitted). 
The Service issued a revenue ruling disagreeing with the result in Monterey in which it 
argued that the private interests of the businessmen precluded qualification under either sub-
section 501(c)(3) or (4). Rev. Rul. 78-86, 1978-1 C.B. 151. This ruling did not, however, re-
spond to the court's claim regarding the absence of any distinction between charitable and 
social welfare organizations. 
In Peters, the Tax Court pointed to a broad definition of "charity" that "embraces any 
benevolent or philanth~opic objective not prohibited by law or public policy which tends to 
advance the well-doing and well-being of man." 21 T.C. at 59. The court then held that the 
taxpayer could deduct contributions to a recognized social welfare organization because "the 
[donee], a nonprofit organization dedicated solely to the promotion of social welfare, should be 
classified as charitable as that term is used in the statute .... " 21 T.C. at 59. This statement 
suggests that all social welfare organizations are charitable. The organization was a founda-
tion organized to furnish public swimming facilities for residents of a community who did not 
have and could not afford private facilities, "to create and promote better understanding and 
sympathy between the people of the community and to further the general welfare and health 
of all of the people .... " 21 T.C. at 55-56. The Service had recognized the foundation as a 
social welfare organization but denied it charitable status. 
In response to Peters, the Service issued a revenue ruling concurring with the result but 
stating that it "[did] not agree with the implication in that decision that every nonprofit organi-
zation dedicated solely 'to the promotion of social welfare' should be classified as charitable." 
Rev. Rul. 59-310, 1959-2 C.B. 146, 148. 
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proposes that all social welfare organizations11 be accorded charita-
ble status under subsection 50l(c)(3). This proposal would eliminate 
the arbitrary results now reached by the Service, increase the social 
benefits fostered by the income tax deduction for charitable contri-
butions, and generally promote the policies underlying the favorable 
tax treatment of charitable organizations. 
l. THE SERVICE'S APPROACH: DISTINGUISHING CHARITABLE 
ORGANIZATIONS FROM SOCIAL WELFARE 
ORGANIZATIONS 
A. The Service's Position 
Although the Service has held that some social welfare organiza-
tions do not qualify as charitable organizations, 12 it has failed to ar-
ticulate any specific standard for di.ff erentiating between social 
welfare activities and charitable activities. 13 In particular revenue 
rulings, the Service has apparently relied on factors, such as the in-
come of the intended beneficiaries, that distinguish specific forms of 
similar activities. 14 However, the Service's reliance on such factors 
has not been universal; the Service has declared, for example, that 
11. That is, all social welfare organizations that do not attempt to influence legislation, 
See note 4 supra. 
12. See note 6 supra. 
13. One article, which discusses the Service's rulings on aid to business, suggests that the 
determination of whether or not an activity merits charitable or social welfare status might 
hinge on whether "(t]he immediate beneficiary [of assistance is] ... in need of charity." 
Rainey & Henshaw, Exempt Organizations: A Survey, 19 S. TEX. L.J. 205,222 (1978), Where 
the direct beneficiaries, in these revenue rulings owners of a business, are in need of charity, 
assistance "confer[s] an immediate charitable benefit," id at 222, which is not the case where 
direct beneficiaries have no such need. The authors then point to a subsequent ruling, Rev. 
Rul. 76-419, 1976-2 C.B. 146, where charitable status was granted to an organization directly 
assisting business investment in a depressed area. Because the immediate beneficiaries were 
not "in need of charity," the authors suggest that "a new type of charitable organization ap• 
pears to be emerging,'' which would be an exception to their theory. Id at 223. As a general 
approach, this direct/indirect test, even if it were to remain valid, could at most be just one 
factor in determining charitable status, since the Service has ruled other organizations charita• 
ble where immediate beneficiaries were in no real "need of charity." See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-
147, 1976-1 C.B. 151 (community organization in higher income area); Rev. Rul. 69-257, 1969-
1 C.B. 151 (organization awarding scholarship without regard to need); Rev. Ru!. 66-146, 
1966-1 C.B. 136 (organization organized and operated for public recognition of outstanding 
achievement). 
14. Compare Rev. Rul. 65-299, 1965-2 C.B. 165, with Rev. Rul. 69-441, 1969-2 C.B. 115. 
In Rev. Ru!. 65-299, the Service declared that a consumer credit counseling service was eligible 
for social welfare status because its activities "contribute to the betterment of the community 
as a whole." 1965-2 C.B. at 166. Charitable status was denied, however, because those "cligi• 
ble for assistance are not limited to those who arc in need of such assistance as proper recipi-
ents of charity." 1965-2 C.B. at 166. In subsequent Rev. Rul. 69-441, the Service granted 
charitable status to a similar organization that directly assisted only those with low incomes. 
The Tax Court rejected the Service's determination in Rev. Rul. 65-299 that the credit counsel-
ing organization was not charitable. See Consumer Credit Counseling Serv., Inc. v. United 
States, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9660 (D.D.C. 1978). Compare Rev. Ru!. 67-294, 1967-2 
C.B. 193 (social welfare status granted to organization that made business loans without regard 
to the wealth of the businesses or the income of the owners to induce businesses to locate in an 
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one form of the same general activity is charitable and another pro-
motes social welfare, without explaining the basis for the distinction. 
Hence, one nonprofit organization providing bus service to the com-
munity may be granted charitable status, while another may only be 
accorded social welfare status. 15 Moreover, even when the Service 
has described how it distinguishes two forms of a single general ac-
tivity, it has not adequately explained why both forms are not chari-
table or how it determines appropriate treatment of dissimilar 
activities. 16 This leaves one to speculate as to the Service's method 
for implementing the distinction that it recognizes between charita-
ble and social welfare organizations. 
A hypothesis consistent with the revenue rulings is that the Serv-
ice makes two determinations when classifying a group as either a 
charitable organization or social welfare organization. The initial 
question seems to involve whether or not the organization's activity 
is conducted for private gain or benefit. To qualify for tax-exempt 
status as either a charitable or social welfare organization, an organi-
zation's activity must not be conducted for private gain or benefit. 17 
economically depressed area), with Rev. Ru!. 74-587, 197~2 C.B. 162 (charitable status 
granted to similar organization that aided disadvantaged businesses). 
Another way that the Service has distinguished similar activities as charitable or social 
welfare is to look at what sectors of the public the activities are aimed at. Compare Rev. Ru!. 
80-215, 1980-2 C.B. 174, with Rev. Ru!. 70-4, 1970-1 C.B. 126 (quoted at note 6supra). In Rev. 
Ru!. 80-215, the Service declared that an organization formed to promote a sport throughout 
the state for competitors under 18 years of age was charitable. The Service noted that the 
organization combated juvenile delinquency and was educational. The Service explicitly dis-
tinguished Rev. Ru!. 70-4, a case involving a similar activity, because the organization in that 
case "directed its activities to all members of the general public without regard to age. The 
subject organization limits its activities to individuals under 18 years of age." 1980-2 C.B. at 
174. The Service had denied charitable status to the organization in the 1970 ruling and classi-
fied it as a social welfare organization. 
15. Compare Rev. Ru!. 78-68, 1978-1 C.B. 149, with Rev. Ru!. 78-69, 1978-1 C.B. 156. In 
Rev. Ru!. 78-68, the Service declared charitable an organization providing bus service to iso-
lated members of a co=unity not served by the existing bus system. In Rev. Ru!. 78-69, the 
Service classified as social welfare an organization formed to provide bus service for a suburb 
during rush hours to supplement existing but inadequate service. Each ruling cited the result 
of the other ruling, but the Service did not explain the distinction that it made between the 
services provided by the two organizations. 
Compare Rev. Ru!. 78-131, 1978-1 C.B. 157 (organization promoting art through annual 
art show granted social welfare status), with Rev. Ru!. 66-178, 1966-1 C.B. 138 (similar organi-
zation qualifies as charitable); Rev. Ru!. 69-384, 1969-2 C.B. 122 (amateur baseball association 
is social welfare organization), with Hutchinson Baseball Enters. v. Co=issioner, 696 F.2d 
757 (10th Cir. 1982) (baseball organization is charitable); Rev. Ru!. 67-109, 1967-1 C.B. 136 
(organization providing a roller rink facility given social welfare status), with Rev. Ru!. 59-3 JO, 
1959-2 C.B. 146 (organization operating a pool and other recreational facilities given charita-
ble status). 
16. Compare Rev. Ru!. 65-195, 1965-2 C.B. 164 (organization that promotes youth activi-
ties and other community benefit programs is social welfare organization), with Rev. Ru!. 76-
418, 1976-2 C.B. 145 (organization with purpose to reduce vehicle deaths by assisting local 
governments is charitable), and Rev. Ru!. 67-291, 1967-2 C.B. 184 (organization that subsi-
dizes a training table for coaches and members of a university's athletic teams is charitable). 
17. Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)-J(d)(l)(ii) (1959) provides that an organization is not charita-
ble "unless it serves a public rather than a private interest" and that the organization must 
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Once it has determined that an organization's activity is not con-
ducted for private enrichment, the Service's second step appears to 
be to categorize the organization as a charitable or social welfare 
one. This determination requires an examination of the benefits to 
the community that a particular organization generates. 18 The Ser-
vice seemingly recognizes two levels of benefits: a minimum level 
"establish that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of private interests." With respect 
to social welfare organizations, Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(ii) (1959) states in part: 
Nor is any organization operated primarily for the promotion of social welfare if its pri-
mary activity is operating a social club for the benefit, pleasure, or recreation of its mem-
bers, or is carrying on a business with the general public in a manner similar to 
organizations which are operated for profit. 
The court in Monterey Pub. Parking Corp. v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1970), 
affd, 481 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1973), noted that "the Regulations aim at discovering whether 
asserted civic or charitable ends are but subterfuges for what is fundamentally a private enter-
prise." 321 F. Supp. at 975. For more complete discussion of Monterey, see note 10 supra and 
note 76 infra. 
Accordingly, the Service has denied exempt status on the basis of private benefit, See, e.g., 
Rev. Rul. 80-107, 1980-1 C.B. 117 (shareholder organization to promote industry interests is 
not social welfare organization); Rev. Rul. 78-132, 1978-1 C.B. 157 (community cooperative to 
facilitate the exchange of personal services among members is not social welfare organization 
because it operates for private benefit); Rev. Rul. 77-111, 1977-1 C.B. 144 (organization to 
stimulate business to remedy economic declines is not charitable, because major benefits ac• 
crue to the businesses); Rev. Rul. 74-553, 1974-2 C.B. 168 (medical association peer review 
board is not charitable, since it serves professional interests). Compare Rev. Rul. 80-301, 1980-
2 C.B. 181 (genealogical society with open membership is charitable), w11h Rev. Rul. 80-302, 
1980-2 C.B. 182 (genealogical society with membership and activities limited to a single family 
is not charitable). 
In addition, the Service's non-acquiescence in one court decision was based on private 
benefit grounds. The court in Eden Hall Farm v. United States, 389 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa, 
1975), upheld social welfare status for a working girls' vacation home. Use of the home was 
available only to limited groups of women invited by the trustees of the Farm, and a corpora-
tion that had other close ties with the Farm employed most of the women who actually used 
the home. The Service, in Rev. Rul. 80-205, 1980-2 C.B. 184, objected to the decision, stating: 
"By restricting use of the facility to employees of selected corporations and their guests, the 
organization is primarily benefiting a private group rather than primarily benefiting the com• 
mon good and general welfare of the co=unity." 1980-2 C.B. at 185. 
In one instance, however, the Service reached the wrong result using the private benefit 
prohibition. In Rev. Rul. 75-286, 1975-2 C.B. 210, the Service denied charitable status to an 
organization composed only of inhabitants of a city block and formed to beautify the block's 
public areas. The organization's restricted membership and the limited scope of its activities 
"indicate that the organization is . . . operated to serve the private interests of its members." 
1975-2 C.B. at 210. The Service held that the organization did qualify for social welfare status, 
however, even though operation for private interests should preclude social welfare status as 
well. 
For further discussion of the private benefit prohibition, see notes 68-73 infra and accom• 
panying text. 
18. The Service's regulations and rulings suggest, implicitly if not explicitly, that commu-
nity benefit is a significant criterion in determining if an organization qualifies as charitable. 
Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (1959) defines "charitable" by referring to its "generally ac-
cepted legal sense," which would include "benefit to the community" whether one looks to tax 
law or other laws. See notes 35-42 infra and accompanying text. 
Regulations concerning the specific purposes deemed charitable under I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) 
(1982), see note 2 supra, illustrate the importance of community benefit when determining an 
organization's charitable status. Treas. Reg. § l.501(c)(3)-l(d)(3)(i)(b) (1959) defines "educa-
tional," as used in subsection 501(c)(3), as relating in part to "[t)he instruction of the public on 
subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the community." Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)· 
l(d)(5) (1959) requires that scientific organizations be "organized and operated in the public 
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and a level beyond the minimum. Organizations that the Service 
places in the social welfare category generate only the minimum 
level of benefits, whereas organizations classified as charitable pro-
duce benefits beyond that minimum.19 Thus, the Service presuma-
bly requires a charitable organization to justify its eligibility to 
receive deductible contributions by showing that it delivers greater 
benefits to the community. 
B. Statutory Basis for the Service's Position 
Two arguments support the distinction drawn by the Service be-
tween charitable and social welfare organizations. 2° First, such a dis-
tinction can be inferred from the fact that different subsections of 
section 501 exempt charitable organizations and social welfare orga-
nizations from income taxation.21 The Service originally took this 
interest." Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(3)-l(d)(l)(ii) (1959), generally applicable to all subsection 
50l(c)(3} organizations, also requires service to a public interest. 
Likewise, to qualify as a social welfare organization, an organization must produce some 
community benefit. Treas. Reg.§ l.50l(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(i) (1959) states: "An organization is op-
erated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare if it is primarily engaged in promoting in 
some way the common good and general welfare of the people of the community." 
See also Rev. Rul. 76-204, 1976-1 C.B. 152 (organization formed for environmental preser-
vation purposes is charitable because its efforts serve a broad public purpose); Rev. Rul. 67-
325, 1967-2 C.B. l 13 (Service discusses the community benefit criterion as it relates to charita-
ble organizations); Rev. Rul. 65-299, 1965-2 C.B. 165 (credit counseling organization is a social 
welfare organization because it promotes the general welfare of the community); Rev. Rul. 65-
195, 1965-2 C.B. 164 (junior chamber of commerce is a social welfare organization because.it 
promotes the common good and general welfare of the community). 
19. It should be emphasized that no case, regulation, revenue ruling, or other source has 
been found where the Service explicitly stated that its decision to deny charitable status to a 
social welfare organization was due to the fact that the organization generated only a minimal 
level of benefits. The Service's decisions in this area are conclusory, and do not offer specific 
rationales for denying charitable status to certain social welfare organizations. However, as 
demonstrated by the cases discussed in the notes below, the results that the Service reaches are 
consistent with the hypothesis that the Service distinguishes between social welfare organiza-
tions and charitable organizations on the basis of the number of community benefits that each 
produces. 
For an example of an activity failing to qualify for charitable status because of insuffi-
cient community benefit, see Rev. Rul. 78-384, 1978-2 C.B. 174. In that ruling, the Service 
denied charitable status to a nonprofit organization owning farmland that used the land only 
for ecologically suitable uses. The Service noted that the land was not ecologically significant 
and that the purpose, therefore, was not charitable. The public benefit was minimal because 
the purpose was so limited. But see Rev. Rul. 76-204, 1976-1 C.B. 152 (organization formed to 
acquire tracts of land for conservation purposes is charitable where the lands are either main-
tained and preserved or are turned over to a governmental conservation agency). 
20. The Service has not expressly attempted to support its position: Thus, the Service has 
never advanced the two arguments given here. However, these are the best arguments avail-
able in defense of the Service's position. 
21. See I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3)-(4) (1982). The text of these provisions is set out at notes 2 & 3 
supra. 
In construing statutes, related provisions and the structure of the act should be considered. 
See Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974); United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 
600, 606 (1941). Courts attempt to avoid an interpretation of a statute that results in redun-
dancy or fails to give effect to a section. See Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307-08 
(1961); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955). Thus, the existence of differ-
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position while advocating a narrow reading of the term "charitable" 
that limited the scope of that term to organizations that help the 
poor.22 Even though the Service now favors a more expansive defini-
tion of the term "charitable,"23 it presumably still rests its distinction 
between charitable and social welfare organizations on this separate 
enumeration argument. 
A second argument supporting the Service's position derives 
from Congress' apparent recognition of the greater social desirability 
of charitable activities as opposed to social welfare activities. Con-
gress has made contributions to charitable organizations tax deducti-
ble.24 It is generally accepted that Congress intended section 170,25 
the Code provision granting the deduction, to apply only to charita-
ble organizations.26 Further, since subsection 170(c) specifically 
ent subsections that exempt charitable and social welfare organizations implies that social wel-
fare organizations were not intended to be subsumed under the category of charitable 
organizations. 
22. See I.T. 1800, 11-2 C.B. 152 (1923). 
23. See note 46 infra and accompanying text. 
24. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (1982). 
25. I.R.C. § 170(a) (1982) provides that charitable contributions can be deducted. I.R.C. 
§ 170(c) (1982) defines what constitutes a "charitable contribution." This provision reads in 
pertinent part: 
(c) Charitable contribution defined.-For the purposes of this section, the term "charita-
ble contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use of-
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest fund, or foundation-
(A) created or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof, or 
under the law of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia, or any possession 
of the United States; 
(B) organized and operated for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educa-
tional purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only 
if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for 
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals; 
(C) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private share-
holder or individual; and 
(D) which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 50l(c)(3) by reason 
of attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in 
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf 
of any candidate for public office. 
A contribution or gift by a corporation to a trust, chest, fund, or foundation shall be 
deductible by reason of this paragraph only ifit is to be used within the United States or 
any of its possessions exclusively for purposes specified in subparagraph (B). 
I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (1982). 
26. The language of the deduction provision closely tracks that of the exemption provision 
for charitable organizations. Compare I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (1982), supra note 25, with I.R.C. 
§ 50l(c)(3) (1982), supra note 2. Because of the virtually identical language, the Supreme 
Court has concluded that it "is apparent that Congress intended that list [of organizations) to 
have the same meaning in both sections (170 and 50l(c)(3)]." Bob Jones Univ. v. United 
States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2026 (1983). The Court also noted that both sections 170 and 50l(c)(3) 
"seek to achieve the same basic goal of encouraging the development of certain organizations 
through the grant of tax benefits. The language of the two sections is in most respects identi-
cal, and the Commissioner and the courts consistently have applied many of the same stan-
dards in interpreting those sections." 103 S. Ct. at 2026 n.10 (citations omitted). Finally, the 
Court said that sections 501(c)(3) and 170 must be construed together. 103 S, Ct. at 2026 n.l I. 
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makes contributions to other entities tax deductible,27 Congress ar-
guably meant to deny tax-deductible treatment for contributions to 
other groups, such as social welfare organizations, not explicitly 
mentioned. Congress made contributions to certain organizations 
tax deductible because it recognized the benefits to the community 
that such organizations generate.28 Because Congress has not explic-
itly made contributions to social welfare organizations tax deductible 
as it has those to charitable organizations, the Service could assert 
that the distinction it draws between these organizations is consistent 
with a congressional preference for charitable organizations. 
II. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE SERVICE'S APPROACH 
Two flaws exist in the Service's position that not all social welfare 
organizations are entitled to recognition as charitable organizations 
as well. First, the Service's statutory justification for denying any 
social welfare organizations such recognition is untenable. Second, 
the absence of any workable standard for determining whether or 
not a social welfare organization qualifies as charitable produces ar-
bitrary results that argue for elimination of the distinction. 
A. Untenability of the Statutory Basis for the Service's Position 
An examination of the legislative history of subsections 50 I ( c )(3) 
and (4) reveals that the existence of separate provisions for charita-
ble and social welfare organizations does not require that any social 
welfare organizations be denied charitable status. 29 The exemption 
for charitable organizations dates back to the Tariff Acts of 189430 
and 1909.31 Although both tariff acts levied taxes only on corpora-
tions doing business for profit,32 they also explicitly exempted reli-
27. Entities that may receive tax-deductible donations include states, cities, and veterans 
organizations. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (1982). 
28. See note 18 supra; note 92 infra . 
. 29. I.R.C. § 50l(c)(4) (1982) exempts both politically active and non-political social wel-
fare organizations. See note 4 supra. This Note argues that denial of charitable status to 
politically active social welfare organizations is proper, see notes 84-87 infra and accompany-
ing text, but that denial of charitable status to non-political social welfare organizations is not. 
As stated previously, this Note uses "social welfare organization" to include only non-political 
social welfare organizations unless otherwise indicated. See note 4 supra. 
30. Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556. This act explicitly exempted from 
income taxation "corporations, companies, or associations organized and conducted solely for 
charitable, religious, or educational purposes," among other organizations. 28 Stat. at 556. 
The income tax imposed by the 1894 act was declared unconstitutional in Pollock v. Farmers' 
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). 
31. Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 113. The pertinent language of this act 
exempted "any corporation or association organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, or educational purposes, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of 
any private stockholder or individual." 36 Stat. at 113. 
32. See Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556-57; Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 
36 Stat. 11, 112-17. 
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gious, charitable, and educational organizations.33 Little direct 
evidence exists as to whether or not Congress intended in these acts 
to restrict "charitable" to its narrow meaning of "relief of the poor"34 
or used it in the broad, common law sense of "purposes beneficial to 
the community."35 However, the language of these statutes closely 
tracks that used in a well-known 1891 British tax case which gave a 
broad definition of "charity,"36 and the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that Congress used the term "charitable" in its broad legal 
sense of "purposes beneficial to the community."37 Thus, the legal 
meaning of "charitable" contained in the 1894 and 1909 acts in-
cluded the purpose for which social welfare organizations operate, 
namely, "the promotion of social welfare."38 
33. See notes 30-31 supra. 
34. See, e.g., LT. 1800, 11-2 C.B. 152-53 (1923). 
35. Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel, (1891] A.C. 531, 583;see 
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 368 comment a (1959). As to the paucity of legis-
lative evidence bearing on this issue, see Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 8, at 301 ("[N]either 
upon their initial enactment nor during the ensuing decades have these exemptions elicited 
more than cursory legislative explanation, save for matters of technical detail."); Reiling, Fed-
eral Taxation: Whal ls a Charitable Organization?, 44 A.B.A. J. 525, 526 (1958). 
36. Commissioners for Special Purposes oflncome Tax v. Pemsel, (1891] A.C. 531. In this 
case before the House of Lords, Lord Macnaghten expressed himself as follows: 
"Charity" in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of pov-
erty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and 
trusts for other purposes beneficial to the co=unity, not falling under any of the preced-
ing heads. The trusts last referred to are not the less charitable in the eye of the law, 
because incidentally they benefit the rich as well as the poor . . . • 
[1891] A.C. at 583. The co=on law of trusts also recognizes similar purposes as "charitable." 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 (1959). 
37. In Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983), the Supreme Court quoted 
the broad definition of "charity" given in Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax 
v. Pemsel, (1891] A.C. 531, 583, see note 36 supra, noting that this case "has long been recog• 
nized as a leading authority in this country." 103 S. Ct. at 2027. The Court stated that this and 
other broad definitions of "charity" or "charitable" contained in still earlier Supreme Court 
cases "clearly reveal the legal background against which Congress enacted the first charitable 
exemption statute in 1894." 103 S. Ct. at 2027 (footnote omitted). The Court also observed 
that the terms of the 1894 exemption "were in substance included" in the Tariff Act of 1909. 
103 S. Ct. at 2027 n.i4. Thus, the Court acknowledged that the broad legal meaning of "char-
ity," which includes "purposes beneficial to the co=unity," was used by Congress in the 1894 
and 1909 acts. 
In addition, Reiling states: "[F]or Congress to intend . . . that charity shall have its legal 
meaning is not a new concept. In adopting terms known to the law of charities, it adopted a 
pattern traditionally employed in the states." Reiling, supra note 35, at 526. Reiling also notes 
that "if Congress used the term 'charitable' in its generally accepted legal sense - and there is 
no evidence that it intended any other meaning- the use of the word ... is alone sufficient to 
bring the legal concept into operation." Id at 526. See also cases cited at note 45 i,!fra. 
38. I.R.C. § 50l(c)(4) (1982). The law of trusts in the United States has always recognized 
purposes beneficial to the co=unity or promoting the public or social welfare as charitable. 
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 368(£) (1935) ("Charitable purposes include ... other 
purposes the accomplishment of which is beneficial to the community .... "); RESTATEMENT 
OF TRUSTS § 368 co=ent a (1935) ("The co=on element of all charitable purposes is that 
they are designed to accomplish objects which are beneficial to the community."). The Re-, 
statement treats "other purposes beneficial to the co=unity" as a residuary clause for chari-
table purposes: ''The present Section (374] deals with the large and indefinite classes of 
purposes other than those which are dealt with in the preceding Sections which are neverthe-
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In the Tariff Act of 1913, Congress added a new tax exemption 
specifically for social welfare organizations.39 The particular reason 
for the inclusion of this exemption in the 1913 act is unclear.40 How-
less held to promote the social interests of the co=unity and are upheld as falling within the 
scope of charitable purposes." RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 374 co=ent a (1935). The more 
recent Restatement adopts an identical position. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 
§§ 368, 374 (1959); see also 4 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 368, at 2853 (3d ed. 1967) 
("[T]here must be added a more general and indefinite category, a general catchall, to include 
the vast number of miscellaneous purposes which are properly held to be charitable. Perhaps 
these can best be included under the heading of other purposes the accomplishment of which is 
beneficial to the co=unity."); id § 374. 
39. Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172. The last clause of the general 
exemption provision exempts "any civic league or organization not organized for profit, but 
operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare." 38 Stat. at 172. 
40. If"charitable" in the 1913 act was to be construed in the same broad sense that it was 
used in the 1909 act, then a separate exemption provision for social welfare organizations 
would seem unnecessary: the charitable exemption would already have included such organi-
zations. This raises the argument that the addition of the social welfare organization exemp-
tion in the 1913 act was meant to restrict "charitable" to its narrow definition of "relief of the 
poor." See note 34supra and accompanying text. However, no evidence exists to support this 
argument. See notes 52-54 infra and accompanying text. 
The role of the social welfare exemption puzzled one member of the 1921 Senate. Prior to 
1939, revenue acts were normally passed every other year, often carrying over verbatim lan-
guage from the previous act. See w. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 12 (2d 
ed. 1979). During debate over the Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 227, Senator Wadsworth 
questioned the language of the social welfare exemption, which was unchanged from the Rev-
enue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1057. He noted that" 'civic leagues or organizations' ... is a rather 
vague term." 61 CONG. REC. 5824 (1921). Further, he observed that" 'social welfare' ... is 
equally vague and there will always be a good deal of dispute as to what 'social welfare' may 
be." Id at 5824. Senator Wadsworth then suggested that "social welfare" be stricken from the 
provision. Id at 5825. In response to this suggestion, two senators pointed out that the provi-
sion had merely been carried over. One stated: "It is the same as the old law, which has been 
in force for a number of years." Id at 5825 (statement of Sen. McCumber). The other senator 
added: "As I understand it, it has been administered by the department without any trouble." 
Id at 5825 (statement of Sen. Walsh). In response, Senator Wadsworth said: "Then I with-
draw my proposed amendment, but I am still hungry for a definition of 'social welfare.'" Id 
at 5825. 
Initially, the social welfare provision was virtually ignored by the Service. The first regula-
tion that cited the social welfare provision offered only an example of an organization that was 
not within its scope because it was organized for profit. See Treas. Reg. 62, art. 519 (1922), 
reprinted in I I INTERNAL REVENUE REGULATIONS 174 (Carlton Fox Collection of the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law Library). A 1919 regulation had seemed to recognize that the promotion 
of social welfare came within the scope of charitable purposes when it cited as an example of a 
charitable organization an association "aiding the general body of litigants by improving the 
efficient administration of justice.'' Treas. Reg. 62, art. 517 (1922), reprinted in 11 INTERNAL 
REVENUE REGULATIONS 172, 173 (Carlton Fox Collection of the University of Michigan Law 
Library); see also S-992, 1 C.B. 145 (1919) ("The word 'charitable' has a broad significance."); 
A.R.R. 477, 4 C.B. 264,265 (1921) (appeals co=ittee notes with approval a solicitor's opinion 
citing the legal definition of "charitable" as being "a gift, act, or service for the benefit of an 
indefinite number of persons"). Nonetheless, in a 1923 ruling the Service first asserted that the 
social welfare provision limited the scope of "charitable" to its popular sense, which excluded 
the promotion of social welfare. See I.T. 1800, II-2 C.B. 152 (1923); note 43 infra. 
The Service subsequently amended the regulations to reflect this narrower interpretation of 
"charitable." Article 517 was amended to read as follows: "Corporations organized and oper-
ated exclusively for charitable purposes comprise, in general, organizations for the relief of the 
poor.'' Treas. Reg. 65, art. 517, T.D. 3735, IV-2 C.B. 76, 77 (1925), reprinted in 11 INTERNAL 
REVENUE REGULATIONS 152, 152 (Carlton Fox Collection of the University of Michigan Law 
Library). The regulations defined the social welfare provision broadly: "Civic leagues . . . 
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ever, no clear evidence suggests that Congress intended to restrict the 
broad meaning of "charitable" so as to exclude social welfare orga-
nizations from the category of charitable organizations established 
by the Tariff Acts of 1894 and 1909.41 
It is now generally accepted that the broad, common law notion 
of charity, which includes the promotion of social welfare,42 ex-
presses the original and continuing meaning of "charitable" under 
tax law. The Service asserted in 1923 that "charitable" was to be 
construed in its narrow, popular sense,43 and thus required that orga-
comprise those not organized for profit but operated exclusively for purposes beneficial to the 
community as a whole. In general, organizations engaged in promoting the welfare of man-
kind, other than organizations comprehended within [the charitable exemption], are included 
...• " Treas. Reg. 65, art. 519 (1924), reprinted in 11 INTERNAL REVENUE REGULATIONS 153 
(Carlton Fox Collection of the University of Michigan Law Library). 
Commentators did not view the addition of the social welfare exemption as narrowing the 
definition of "charitable." Black construed the charitable exemption broadly in 1919, see note 
41 inji-a, as he had in 1913 after the original passage of the social welfare exemption. See H. 
BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INCOME TAXATION§ 81 (1st ed. 1913). Moreover, he 
could offer no insight on the meaning of the social welfare exemption. See H. BLACK, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INCOME TAXATION § 127 (4th ed. 1919) [hereinafter cited as H. 
BLACK, 1919 TREATISE]. Another author suggested that "charitable" should be interpreted 
broadly,see R. FOSTER, A TREATISE ON THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX UNDER THE ACT OF 1913 
§ 41, at 171-72 (2d ed. 1915), and did nothing more than quote the social welfare exemption in 
his treatise. Id § 41, at 164. 
41. No legislative history suggests that the use of "charitable" in 1913 was intended to be 
different from its 1909 usage, which included within its purview the purposes of social welfare 
organizations. See notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, the language of the 
1913 exemption for charitable organizations was identical to that of the 1909 provision with 
the exception of the addition of the term "scientific" to the listing of specific exempt purposes, 
Compare Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172, with Tariff Act of 1909, ch, 6, 
§ 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112. 
At least one scholar writing after passage of the 1913 act expressed the view that "charita-
ble" was to be broadly construed: 
The rules with reference to the exemption of such associations from the burdens of ordi-
nary taxation have been well worked out by the courts, and will generally be found appli-
cable in the case of the special tax here under consideration .... [l]t is a general rule, in 
the construction of exemptions from taxation that the word "charity" is not to be re• 
stricted to the relief of the sick or poor, but extends to any form of philanthropic endeavor 
or public beneficence. 
H. BLACK, 1919 TREATISE, supra note 40, § 123 (footnotes 01nitted). 
42. See note 38 supra and accompanying text. 
43. This position was set out in a 1923 ruling: 
It will be seen that "charitable" in [its] broad sense includes, among other things, edu-
cation, religion, relief of the poor, social service, and civic or public benefactions. On the 
other hand, "charitable" in its popular and ordinary sense pertains to the relief of the 
poor .•.. 
In section 231(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918 and 1921 the organizations enumerated 
are religious, charitable, scientific, literary, and educational, while in section 231(8) Con• 
gress specifically mentions civic leagues and organizations operated exclusively for the 
promotion of social welfare. It seems obvious that the intent must have been to use the 
word "charitable" in section 231(6) in its more restricted and common meaning and not to 
include either religious, scientific, literary, educational, civic, or social welfare organiza-
tions. Otherwise, the word "charitable" would have been used by itself as an all-inclusive 
term ..•. 
Considering subdivisions (6) and (8) of section 231 together, it is seen that a distinction 
is made between religious, charitable (in its ordinary sense), scientific, literary, and educa-
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nizations provide relief for the poor to be considered charitable.44 
Over the years courts resisted this restrictive interpretation,45 how-
ever, and the Service finally acquiesced in 1959 by changing its regu-
lations to recognize the broader meaning of "charitable."46 In doing 
so, the Service brought its interpretation back into line with that in-
tional organizations, on the one hand, and civic and social welfare organizations on the 
other hand. 
I.T. 1800, 11-2 C.B. 152, 153 (1923). 
44. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. 65, art. 517, T.D. 3735, IV-2 C.B. 76 (1925),reprintedin 11 INTER-
NAL REVENUE REGULATIONS 152 (Carlton Fox Collection of the University of Michigan Law 
Library); Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.lOl(c)-l(b) (1953). 
45. See Arthur Jordan Found. v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 885, 888 (7th Cir. 1954) (citing 
and applying broad definition of "charitable," noting that "the use of funds for social advance-
ment ... would tend 'to promote the well doing and well being of social man'") (quoting 
Ould v. Washington Hosp. for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303,311 (1877)); St. Louis Union Trust Co. 
v. Barnet, 59 F.2d 922, 926 (8th Cir. 1932) (citing and applying broad "definition of a legal 
charity"); Bok v. McCaughn, 42 F.2d 616, 618-19 (3d Cir. 1930) (pointing to several broad 
definitions of "charitable"); United States v. Proprietors of Social Law Library, 102 F.2d 481, 
483 (1st Cir. 1929) (looking at legal meaning of charitable); Koehler v. Lewellyn, 44 F.2d 654, 
655-56 (W.D. Pa. 1930) (applying legal definition of charity) ("We do not believe that we have 
the power to read into the act of Congress the restriction [requirement of relief of the poor] 
which the ... [Service] asks us to."); DeForest v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 595, 599 (1930) 
(aid to needy is not exclusive meaning of "charity"); Turnure v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 871 
(1927) (arguing that broad definition of charitable allows contributions to social welfare organ-
ization to be deductible);seea/so Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930); Peters 
v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 55, 59 (1953) (discussed at note 10 supra). 
More recent cases show that courts continue to accept the broad scope of "charitable." See, 
e.g., National Right to Work Legal Defense & Educ. Found. v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 
801,807 (E.D.N.C. 1979) (organization providing legal aid to workers suffering discrimination 
through compulsory union arrangements held charitable) ("[T]he threshold question is 
whether the taxpayer renders community benefit."); Virginia Professional Standards Review 
Found. v. Blumenthal, 466 F. Supp. 1164, 1170 (D.D.C. 1979) (professional self-regulation 
function served the public and therefore did not preclude charitable status); Northern Cal. 
Cent. Serv. v. United States, 591 F.2d 620, 626 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (hospital services organization 
was charitable under public benefit test); Consumer Credit Counseling Serv., Inc. v. United 
States, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9660 (D.D.C. 1979) (credit counseling service was charita-
ble even though it served the public, not just the impoverished). 
46. Treas. Reg.§ l.50l(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (1959) defines "charitable" in its "generally accepted 
legal sense." The current regulation relating to I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (1982) was promulgated in 
1959 and made applicable to tax years beginning after July 26, 1959. See T.D. 6391, 1959-2 
C.B. 140; Treas. Reg.§ l.50l(c)(3)-l(f) (1959). 
Although the Service's reasons for abandoning its narrow view of charity in 1959 are not 
clear, a 1958 article written by the Assistant Chief Counsel to the Internal Revenue Service is 
revealing. The author points to the use of charity in its legal sense and quotes from a British 
tax case which notes that trusts for purposes beneficial to the community "are not the less 
charitable . . . because incidentally they benefit the rich as well as the poor, as indeed every 
charity must do either directly or indirectly." Reiling, supra note 35, at 527 (footnote omitted). 
Reiling rejected the narrow view - the view of the regulations at the time of his writing - as 
impracticable. Id at 527. 
While the Service now interprets "charitable" in its broad legal sense, it has not explicitly 
applied the legal concept of charity to social welfare organizations. Rather, the Service has 
treated "charitable" and "social welfare" as distinct concepts. See, e.g., Rev. Ru!. 75-384, 
1975-2 C.B. 204 (war protest organization was not charitable under the law of trusts and did 
not provide social welfare, since its purpose was contrary to the common good and general 
welfare); Rev. Ru!. 74-361, 1974-2 C.B. 159 (volunteer fire department was charitable under 
the law of trusts and also qualified as a social welfare organization because it promoted the 
common good and general welfare); see also Monterey Pub. Parking Corp. v. United States, 
321 F. Supp. 972, 975 (N.D. Cal. 1970), affd, 481 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1973) (Service cited trust 
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tended by Congress in the Tariff Act of 1913 and its predecessor 
statutes.47 
Since the term "charitable" as used in the 1913 act was intended 
to be construed in its broad sense, modem social welfare organiza-
tions48 should also fall within the category of charitable organiza-
tions. The purpose of social welfare organizations, namely, the 
"promotion of social welfare,"49 was "charitable" under the 1913 
act.5° Current section 50l(c)(3) retains the same meaning of "charita-
ble" used in the 1913 act.51 Therefore, a group that qualifies as a 
law private benefit prohibition as basis for denying charitable status; cited operation as a busi-
ness as basis for denying social welfare status). 
Proposed regulations published earlier than those adopted in 1959 would have gone further 
in recognizing the broad sense of "charitable." They stated that the definition of that term 
"includes ... promotion of social welfare" without listing specific social welfare purposes that 
qualify. (Current regulations make such a listing. See note 5supra.) Treas. Reg.§ l.50l(c)(3)-
l(d)(2), 24 Fed. Reg. 1421, 1423 (1959) (proposed February 26, 1959). If the Service had 
adopted these regulations, it would have essentially taken the same position that this Note 
advocates. Why the final regulations changed the proposals to include a list of qualifying 
social welfare purposes is not clear. 
47. See notes 29-41 supra and accompanying text. The Service's earlier construction of 
"charitable" had received some attention from Congress in 1924. Senator Willis noted the 
Service's narrow interpretation of the charitable deduction provision and proposed an amend-
ment to override the Co=issioner's determination by defining "charitable" to include certain 
forms of "preventive and constructive service." See 65 CONG. REC. 8171 (1924). Other sena-
tors objected on the grounds that Senator Willis' suggestion was vague and overly broad. See 
id. at 8172 (statements of Sens. Smoot and Walsh). Neither the narrow nor the broad defini-
tions of "charitable" were discussed, however, and Senator Willis eventually withdrew his 
amendment. See id. at 8173. 
In 1932, Rep. Wolcott expressed a similar concern that "charitable" was vulnerable to nar-
row interpretation, and proposed to add the term "character-building" to the deduction provi-
sion. See 75 CONG. REC. 6487 (1932) (statement of Rep. Wolcott). Another congressman 
objected that such an amendment would "delimit the construction of the word 'charitable.' " 
Id. at 6488 (statement of Rep. Stafford) (emphasis added). Rep. Wolcott was subsequently 
satisfied that the provil.ion was construed broadly enough to relieve his concern, and his 
amendment was rejected. See id. at 6488. 
48. Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(i) (1959) states: "An organization is operated exclu-
sively for the promotion of social welfare if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way 
the co=on good and general welfare of the people of the community." The first regulations 
defining social welfare organizations similarly stated: "Civic leagues ... comprise those not 
organized for profit but operated exclusively for purposes beneficial to the community as a 
whole. In general, organizations engaged in promoting the welfare of mankind, other than 
organizations comprehended within . . . [the charitable exemption,] are included ...• " 
Treas. Reg. 65, art. 519 (1924),reprintedin 11 INTERNAL REVENUE REGULATIONS 153 (Carlton 
Fox Collection of the University of Michigan Law Library). 
Courts generally agree with this characterization of the social welfare exemption. See Peo-
ple's Educ. Camp Socy. v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1964). Moreover, the legisla-
tive history does not suggest any other intended meaning. See note 40 supra. 
49. I.R.C. § 50l(c)(4) (1982); see also note 48 supra. 
50. See notes 29-41 supra and accompanying text. 
51. The language of I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (1982) does not reveal a congressional intent to 
narrow the meaning of"charitable." While subsection 50l(c)(3) lists several purposes in addi-
tion to a charitable purpose that qualify an organization for tax-exempt status, this does not 
mean that these additional purposes fall outside the meaning of "charitable." Rather, all the 
purposes listed in subsection 50l(c)(3) are charitable. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 
103 S. Ct. 2017, 2026 (1983). Moreover, although the term "charitable" includes the specified 
purposes, it is not limited to them. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 368 comment b 
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social welfare organization under present law should qualify as a 
charitable organization as well. 
Yet the argument remains that Congress must have had some 
purpose in creating a separate class of social welfare organizations, 
and that this purpose may have been to exclude them from the chari-
table organization classification.52 However, no clear evidence in the 
legislative history of section 501 indicates a congressional intent to 
exclude social welfare organizations from the charitable classifica-
tion.53 On the contrary, as detailed above, ample evidence suggests 
(1959). Treas. Reg.§ l.50l(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (1959) includes purposes other than relief of poverty 
in its definition of charitable. See note 5 supra. Likewise, the courts have recognized that 
"charitable" as used in subsection 50l(c)(3) is not limited to relief of the poor. See Bob Jones 
Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 150-51 (4th Cir. 1980), qffd, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983); see 
also Reiling, supra note 35, at 527-28. · 
52. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text. 
53. The legislative history of the social welfare exemption is inconclusive on the meaning 
of the term. See notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text. Some, however, have gleaned 
what they regard as the impetus for the exemption from portions of 1913 Senate hearings on 
the legislation that introduced the social welfare provision. See People's Educ. Camp Socy. v. 
Commissioner, 331 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1964); McGovern, The Exemption Provisions of Sub-
chapter F, 29 A.B.A. TAX LAW. 523, 530 (1976). In the hearings, the United States Chamber of 
Commerce requested a specific exemption of "civic and commercial organizations." Briefs and 
Statements: Hearings on Tar!ff Schedules of the Revenue Act of 1913 (H.R 3321) Before the 
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 2001 (statement ofE. Good-
win, General Secretary, Chamber of Commerce of the United States) [hereinafter cited as 
Briefs and Statements]. This statement noted that the then-proposed 1913 tariff made no spe-
cific exemption of civic and commercial organizations. Such an exemption would have been 
unnecessary previously, because the 1909 tariff had taxed only corporations organized for 
profit. The statement also noted the Chamber's belief that the charitable exemption did not 
cover civic and commercial organizations. In addition, the American Warehousemen's Associ-
ation requested a provision similar to the Chamber's. See Briefs and Statements, supra, at 
2040. 
These beliefs as to the scope of "charitable," based perhaps on the interpretation of "chari-
table" in its popular sense, imply that the Chamber of Commerce and the American Ware-
housemen's Association did not consider social welfare organizations ("civic organizations") 
charitable. One could thus argue that in adopting the social welfare exemption, Congress ac-
cepted the narrow meaning of charitable held by these groups. The Senate Finance Commit-
tee passed the following 1913 amendment to the provision: 
[The corporate income tax shall not apply (l)] to business leagues, nor to chambers of 
commerce or boards of trade, not organized for profit or no part of the net income of 
which inures to the benefit of the private stockholder or individual; nor [(2)] to any civic 
league or organization not organized for profit, but operated exclusively for the promotion 
of social welfare . . . . 
J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS: 1938-1861, 
at 1002 (1938). The Supreme Court has recognized these groups' statements as the impetus for 
the 1913 exemption of business leagues, which originated in the Senate Finance Committee 
and appears above as the first clause of the committee's amendment. See National Muffler 
Dealers Assn. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 478-79 (1979). Thus, that the Chamber of Com-
merce and the American Warehousemen's Association had referred to "civic" and "business" 
organizations is significant considering the language of the Committee's amendment. 
Nonetheless, the possibility that these groups spurred the addition of the social welfare 
exemption does not necessarily mean that Congress adopted a narrow view of "charity," be-
cause the statements of the groups did not clearly adopt that narrow view. It is more likely 
that the groups were referring to charity in its broad legal sense. Their statements focused on 
the "commercial advancement," "trade and commerce," and business "membership" attrib-
utes of business organizations. See Briefs and Statements, supra, at 2002. These statements 
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that Congress meant to include groups whose aim is the "promotion 
of social welfare" within the category of tax-exempt charitable 
organizations. 54 
Furthermore, given that Congress intended all along that social 
welfare organizations be included within the class of charitable orga-
nizations, no need exists for a separate provision to make contribu-
tions to social welfare organizations tax deductible because such 
contributions should be deductible under the provision pertaining to 
charitable organizations.55 Hence, the absence of a specific provision 
granting a tax deduction for contributions to social welfare organiza-
tions does not imply that Congress sought to distinguish these orga-
nizations from charitable ones or felt them less beneficial to the 
public.56 They are charitable organizations. 
displayed a concern for an exemption for business organizations, understandable given the 
business nature of both the Chamber of Commerce and the American Warehousemen's Asso• 
ciation. The business groups were correct in their view that these organizations were not chari• 
table and thus did not qualify under the already-existing charitable exemption; business 
leagues and chambers of commerce generally are not charitable in the law of trusts because 
they operate for the benefit of their members. See 4 A. Scorr, supra note 38, § 375.2, at 2957-
58 (3d ed. 1961);seealso Rev. Ru!. 78-132, 1978-1 C.B. 157; Rev. Ru!. 74-553, 1974-2 C.B. 168. 
However, the groups were incorrect in assuming that social welfare organizations ("civic orga-
nizations") were also not charitable for the same reason. Although no organization operating 
for private benefit may be charitable, see notes 68-77 infra and accompanying text, social wel-
fare organizations must operate for public, as opposed to private, benefit. See note 17 supra. 
Thus, the statements by the Chamber of Commerce and the American Warehousemen's Asso-
ciation could have confused Congress by incorrectly associating civic organizations, operated 
for public benefit, with business organizations, operated for private benefit. This would ex• 
plain the existence of a separate exemption provision for social welfare organizations, despite 
their charitable nature. In any event, no clear statement that Congress meant to exclude social 
welfare organizations from the category of charitable organizations can be gleaned from the 
legislative record. 
54. See notes 29-51 supra and accompanying text. 
55. See I.R.C. § 170 (1982); see also note 34 supra. 
56. An examination of earlier legislation that granted charitable deductions does not reveal 
a congressional intent to exclude social welfare organizations from receiving this benefit. The 
War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330, enabled individuals to deduct 
contributions to charitable organizations as a war measure. The language of the provision 
closely paralleled that of the charitable exemption, which this Note argues included social 
welfare organizations, see notes 29-41 supra and accompanying text, and it was construed 
accordingly. See Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 251, T.D. 3146 (1920 ed.), reprinted in 8 INTERNAL REV· 
ENUE REGULATIONS 100 (Carlton Fox Collection !Jf the University of Michigan Law Library). 
Corporations became eligible for charitable deductions in 1935. See Revenue Act of 1935, Ch. 
29, § l02(c), 49 Stal 1014, 1016. No explicit reference to social welfare organizations accom• 
panied either the War Revenue Act of 1917 or the Revenue Act of 1935. Thus, Congress did 
not attempt explicitly to exclude them from the group of charitable organizations benefited by 
these later acts. 
Moreover, the argument that Congress implicitly denied eligibility for deductible contribu• 
lions to social welfare organizations in the 1917 and 1935 acts is not supportable. The social 
welfare exemption had no defined meaning when the 1917 act was passed. See notes 39-41 
supra and accompanying text. Given this, Congress could not have implicitly denied social 
welfare organizations the benefit of the 1917 act because what type of organizations were social 
welfare ones was not clear at the time. Further, Congress merely used the language in the 
individual deduction provision in adopting the corporate deduction provision contained in the 
1935 act. In doing so, it does not appear that Congress intended that this new provision be 
interpreted under the Service's then-existing regulations, which included a narrow interprela• 
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B. The Arbitrary Results Produced by the Service's .Distinction 
As noted earlier, the Service apparently distinguishes between 
charitable organizations and social welfare organizations based on 
the number of community benefits that each type of organization 
generates.57 Such a distinction leads to arbitrary results for two rea-
sons. First, Congress has not set out any guidelines for distinguish-
ing the two organizations58 and no characteristics of the 
organizations themselves suggest a workable basis for such a distinc-
tion. 59 Second, attempts to quantify community benefits are doomed 
to fail because such benefits are inherently unquantifiable.60 
tion of "charitable." See notes 43-44 supra. The position of many courts on the meaning of 
"charitable" in 1935 was opposed to that of the Service. See note 45 supra. It is not possible to 
determine which of the two views, if either, Congress implicitly adopted in the 1935 act. 
In short, the issue whether or not a distinction exists between charitable and social welfare 
organizations arises only because of the existence of separate exemption provisions for each 
type oforganization in the Code. See I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3)-(4) (1982). No other plausible reason 
can be found in the legislative history of the exemption and deduction provisions pertaining to 
these two types of organizations to exclude social welfare organizations from the general cate-
gory of charitable organizations. See notes 52-54 supra and accompanying text. 
51. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text. 
58. Congress has not expressed any judgment on the degree, if any, to which charitable 
activities are more beneficial than social welfare activities. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)-(4) (1982); 
notes 29-51 supra and accompanying text. The argument made by this Note, of course, is that 
social welfare activities are a form of charitable activities. 
59. One commentator states: "[T]he specific criteria to be utilized in distinguishing ... [a] 
social welfare organization from ... [a] charitable organization that promotes social welfare 
are unclear." 2 s. WEITHORN, TAX TECHNIQUES FOR FOUNDATIONS AND OTHER EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS§ 5.06, at5-129 (1980). See also Treas. Reg.§§ l.50l(c)(3)-l(d)(2); l.50(c)(4)-
l(a)(2)(i) (1959) ("charitable" and "social welfare" defined by reference to one another); Rev. 
Ru!. 74-361, 1974-2 C.B. 159 (same organization may simultaneously qualify under both 
I.R.C. 50l(c)(3) and 50l(c)(4) (1982)); B. HOPKINS, supra note I, at 255-56 ("[T]he concepts of 
what is 'charitable' and what constitutes 'social welfare' can be very much alike."); Bittker & 
Rahdert, supra note 8, at 346-48; Chester, The Charitable Foundation in Wisconsin, 43 MARQ. 
L. REV. 301, 305 (1960). 
60. In Treas. Reg.§ l.50l(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (1959), quoted at note 5 supra, the Service set out a 
list of categories that constitute charitable purposes. If an activity falls into one of these cate-
gories, it presumably generates the greater number of benefits that the Service apparently re-
quires for charitable organizations. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text. Such a 
quantification approach to distinguishing between charitable and social welfare organizations, 
however, is made impracticable by the amorphous character of charitable purposes: 
A purpose is charitable if its accomplishment is of such social interest to the community as 
to justify permitting the property to be devoted to the purpose in perpetuity. There is no 
fixed standard to determine what purposes are of such social interest to the community; 
the interests of the community vary with time and place. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368, comment b (1959). Given that "no fixed stan-
dard" exists whereby to determine that a purpose rises to the level of charitable, attempts by 
the Service to distinguish between charitable and social welfare organizations based on the 
amount of community benefits generated by each inevitably lead to arbitrary and unpredict-
able results. 
In apparent recognition of the difficulty of arriving at a precise definition of charitable 
purposes, Treas. Reg. § l.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (1959) states that the list of charitable purposes it 
contains is not exclusive. See note 5 supra; cf. Rev. Ru!. 80-200, 1980-2 C.B. 173 (charitable 
includes care of orphans); Rev. Ru!. 76-204, 1976-1 C.B. 152 (preservation of the environment 
is charitable). 
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The Service's treatment of specific charitable organizations under 
subsection 50l{c)(3) contrasts with the quantification approach pre-
sumably used to distinguish social welfare organizations under sub-
section 50l{c)(4). When deciding whether or not an organization 
promotes a purpose explicitly recognized as "charitable" under sub-
section 50l(c)(3),61 such as education62 or the prevention of cruelty 
to children,63 the Service does not try to quantify the benefit to the 
community. Instead, it simply examines the characteristics and func-
tions of the organization to make this determination. How much 
knowledge the organization's activities convey or how many children 
they protect is irrelevant. 64 Attempts to quantify such benefits would 
be administratively unfeasible. 
Indeed, the Service's apparent attempts to quantify such benefits 
in determining whether or not a social welfare organization qualifies 
as charitable illustrate the weakness of such an approach. As out-
lined earlier, no consistent pattern appears in the Service's deci-
sions.65 This state of affairs leaves one to speculate as to the criteria 
that the Service uses, makes the Service's decisions appear arbitrary, 
and does not give the predictability that the tax law should provide. 
Ill. A SUPERIOR APPROACH: RECOGNIZING SOCIAL WELFARE 
ORGANIZATIONS AS CHARITABLE UNDER§ 50l(c)(3) 
A. A Proposed Method of Classification 
The Service and courts should abandon any attempt to distin-
guish social welfare organizations from charitable organizations by 
quantifying the community benefits produced by each type of organ-
ization.66 Rather, they should recognize social welfare organizations 
as charitable under subsection 50l(c)(3), which would make such or-
ganizations eligible to receive deductible contributions.67 To achieve 
61. I.R.C. § 50l(c}(3) (1982) explicitly recognizes the following purposes as charitable: 
religious; scientific; testing for public safety; literary; educational; national or international 
amateur sports competition; prevention of cruelty to children or animals. See note 2 supra. 
62. See I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (1982); see also Rev. Rul. 67-291, 1967-2 C.B. 184 (organization 
that subsidized a training table for coaches and athletes of a university's athletic teams is chari-
table under § 50l(c)(3) because it thereby furthers the school's educational program); Rev. 
Rul. 66-178, 1966-1 C.B. 138 (organization sponsoring an art exhibit falls within subsection 
50l(c)(3) as a charitable or educational organization). 
63. See I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (l982);seea!so Rev. Rul. 67-151, 1967-1 C.B. 134 (organization 
to protect working children comes within subsection 50l(c)(3)). 
64. Even if an organization operates for one of the charitable purposes specified in I.R.C. 
§ 50l(c)(3) (1982), see note 61 supra, to qualify as charitable it must not be conducted for 
private gain. See note 17 supra and accompanying text. 
65. See notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text. 
66. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text. 
67. That is, except for "political" social welfare organizations, or "action organizations," 
which would not qualify for charitable status. See note 4 supra; notes 84-87 i,!fra and accom-
panying text. 
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recognition as a social welfare and thus charitable organization 
under the approach this Note suggests, however, an organization (1) 
must not operate for private gain, and (2) must benefit the commu-
nity in some way. 
The prohibition on operation for private gain68 has been. consist-
ently enforced by the Service69 and courts. 70 One commentator has 
68. See Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(3)-l{d)(l){ii) (1959). This regulation provides that an or-
ganization is not charitable "unless it serves a public rather than a private interest" and that 
the organization must "establish that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of private 
interests." Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)-l(d)(l)(ii) (1959); see also note 17 supra and accompany-
ing text. The private-gain prohibition is also clearly established in the law of charitable trusts, 
see RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 376 (1959); 4 A. SCOTT, supra note 38, § 376, which 
is often applied in tax cases. See, e.g., Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1158 (D.D.C. 
1971), qjfd. sub nom., Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); Northern Cal. Cent. Serv. v. United 
States, 591 F.2d 620, 626 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Rev. Rul. 76-204, 1976-1 C.B. 152; Rev. Rul. 67-325, 
1967-2 C.B. 113. Reference to trust Jaw to construe "charitable" is proper where this term is 
used in its legal sense. See notes 35-38 supra and accompanying text. 
A distinction must be drawn between the prohibition on private gain, which applies only to 
charitable organizations, and the restriction on "private inurement," which applies to charita-
ble organizations as well as several other tax-exempt organizations. Subsection 50J(c)(3) ex-
plicitly denies charitable status if"[any] part of the net earnings of [the organization] inures to 
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual." I.R.C. § 50J(c)(3) (1982). This private-
inurement restriction is co=on to several other exemption clauses. See I.R.C. § 50l(c)(6)-
(7), (9), (11), (13), (19) (1982). Hopkins explains the private-inurement restriction as follows: 
It appears relatively clear that the statutory concept of private inurement, with its em-
phasis on inurement of "net earnings," contemplates a type of transaction between the 
exempt organization and an individual in the nature of an "insider," the latter able to 
cause the application of the organization's net earnings for private purposes as the result 
of his exercise of control or influence. 
[T)he Service has made it clear that proscribed private inurement involves a transac-
tion or series of transactions, such as unreasonable compensation, unreasonable rental 
charges, or deferred or retained interests in the organization's assets. 
B. HOPKINS, supra note I, at 159 (footnote omitted). See generally id. at 158-76. 
While the focus of the private-inurement restriction is thus transactional, that of the pri-
vate-gain prohibition is more general: it focuses on whether or not the motive for conducting 
the activity in question is to serve the private interests of the organizers. See id. at 49. An 
activity is conducted for private interests when its benefits - monetary or otherwise - are 
intended to accrue primarily to the organizers rather than the public-at-large. See 4 A. SCOTT, 
supra note 38, § 376, at 2971-72. 
The differing aims of the private-inurement restriction and the private-gain prohibition are 
significant with respect to organizations exempted under a provision other than subsection 
50l(c)(3). For example, although business leagues and chambers of commerce will be denied 
exemption under subsection 50l(c)(6) when private inurement exists, see I.R.C. § 50l(c)(6) 
(1982), organization for private gain does not generally preclude exemption under this provi-
sion. See Rev. Rul. 74-553, 1974-2 C.B. 168; Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 8, at 302 ("[O]ther 
exempt organizations (such as chambers of co=erce, consumer cooperative societies, and 
labor unions) are operated primarily for the economic benefit of their members."). But see 
National Muffler Dealers Assn. v. United States. 440 U.S. 472 (1978) (muffler dealers associa-
tion not exempt as a business league because it served dealers of only one manufacturer in an 
industry). However, because such organizations do operate for the private gain of their mem-
bers, they are not eligible for charitable status. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-553, 1974-2 C.B. 168 
(medical peer review board exempt under§ 50l(c)(6) but not under§ 50l(c)(3)); see also 4 A. 
SCOTT, supra note 38, § 375.2, at 2957-61. · 
69. See notes 17 & 68 supra. 
70. See, e.g., Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924); Indus-
trial Addition Assn. v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1945); Virginia Professional Stan-
dards Review Found. v. Blumenthal, 466 F. Supp. 1164, 1173 (D.D.C. 1979) (benefits to 
participants in organization for self-regulation are incidental to broad charitable purpose and, 
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succinctly summarized this prohibition as follows: "If an undertak-
ing is conducted for private profit, it is not charitable. This is true 
although the purposes are such that, if it were not conducted for pri-
vate profit, it would be charitable."71 The rationale for the private-
gain prohibition follows from the tax policies underlying deductibil-
ity of contributions and tax-exempt status. The right to receive de-
ductible contributions and the grant of tax-exempt status provide 
incentives for organizations to engage in beneficial activities for 
which insufficient market incentives exist.72 Where the private gain 
from an activity is great enough, such additional incentives provided 
by the tax law are not necessary to induce people to engage in it. 
Private entities will still conduct the activity for private gain, and the 
activity will still generate community benefits without public subsidi-
zation through the tax law.73 
Nonetheless, some benefit to persons who operate a charitable 
organization is inevitable, since, as members of the community, they 
will enjoy the community benefits produced by the organization's 
activities along with everyone else.74 However, the private-gain pro-
hibition is still administratively feasible. The fact-finder need not 
delve into the minds of the organizers to determine whether these 
persons are acting philanthropically or selfishly.75 Instead, the 
therefore, do not preclude charitable status); Monterey Pub. Parking Corp. v. United States, 
321 F. Supp. 972,976 (N.D. Cal. 1970) ("This court cannot say that plaintiff corporation .. , 
subserves in any substantial way, private interests."), ajfd., 481 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1973); Ken-
tucky Bar Found. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 921 (1982) (benefits accruing to legal profession 
through activities of bar association foundation incidental to broad charitable purpose); 
Dumaine Farms v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 650, 670-71 (1980) (benefits to settlor of scientific 
and educational trust same as those to the general public); Sound Health Assn. v. Commis-
sioner, 71 T.C. 158, 181-85 (1978) (private interests were not served in substantial degree, be-
cause eligibility for membership in organization was practically unlimited); Christian 
Stewardship Assistance, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1037 (1978) (private purposes of organ-
ization's clients precludes exemption); Lake Petersburg Assn. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 259 (1974) (social welfare exemption denied where direct benefit of lake facility was 
only for members). See generally B. HOPKINS, supra note 1, at 47, 49-50, 158-76. 
71. 4 A. Scarr, supra note 38, § 376, at 2965. 
72. See notes 92-94 infra and accompanying text. 
73. Compare Rev. Rul. 80-301, 1980-2 C.B. 181, with Rev. Ru!. 80-302, 1980-2 C.B. 182. 
Rev. Ru!. 80-301 declared that a genealogical society with open membership is charitable be-
cause it educates the public. In Rev. Ru!. 80-302, a similar organization that limited its scope 
to a particular family was denied charitable status, because the primary benefit was to private 
interests. People are educated in both cases, which is a recognized charitable purpose. In the 
latter ruling, however, the family would be likely to pursue the activity for its own education 
without public support through the tax law. 
An organization operating for the mutual benefit of its members that is denied charitable 
status may still be eligible for tax exemption under another Code provision. For a discussion 
of mutual benefit organizations, see note 105 infra. 
74. See, e.g., Ottawa Silica Co. v. United States, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9308, at 
83780 (Ct. Cl. 1982) ("Those benefits that inure to the general public from charitable contribu-
tions are incidental to the contribution, and the donor, as a member of the general public, may 
receive them."); Dumaine Farms v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 650, 670-71 (1980) (benefits to 
settlor of scientific and educational trust same as those available to the general public). 
15. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 8, at 305 n.15. 
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factfinder should compare the benefits that the organizers receive 
with those that the community-at-large receives. If the organizers 
receive benefits substantially greater than, or significantly different 
from, the benefits accruing to the community-at-large, strong evi-
dence exists that the activity violates the private-gain prohibition. 76 
The second criterion that must be met before an entity can be 
considered a social welfare and thus charitable organization, 
namely, that the entity's activities benefit the community in some 
76. Some courts and the Service have disagreed over exactly what extrinsic evidence indi-
cates that those responsible for the operation of an organization have received substantially 
greater or different benefits from the public-at-large. In Eden Hall Farm v. United States, 389 
F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1975), the Service contended that a trust fund created under the will of 
a former employee of the H.J. Heinz Company, for the purpose of operating a recreational 
facility, was not a social welfare organization. The Service pointed to Heinz corporation in-
volvement in trust administration and to statistics showing that 80% of those who used the 
facility were Heinz employees, factors the Service said suggested that the trust operated for 
private purposes. See Rev. Rul. 80-205, 1980-2 C.B. 184, 185 (Service non-acquiescence in 
Eden Hall). The court rejected the Service's contentions and approved social welfare status. It 
noted that "there is no evidence of domination, control or management by the Heinz Com-
pany," 389 F. Supp. at 863, and that the limited invitational procedure to select beneficiaries of 
the facility had a valid purpose. 389 F. Supp. at 866. 
In Monterey Public Parking Corp. v. United States, 321 F.Supp. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1970), 
qffd., 481 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1973), the court upheld charitable and social welfare status for a 
corporation operating a parking facility that served a commercial area of the community. The 
government argued against charitable status, claiming that the activity was conducted for pri-
vate purposes. 321 F. Supp. at 975. The government also objected to social welfare status, 
claiming that " 'carrying on a business with the general public in a manner similar to organiza-
tions organized for profit'" precluded exemption. 321 F. Supp. at 974 (quoting Treas. Reg. 
§ l.50l(c)(4)-l (1959)). The government pointed to special privileges granted to busini:sses that 
supported the activity as evidence of private purposes. 321 F. Supp. at 974. The court ac-
knowledged that the same concern underlies both I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) and (4) (1982). It stated: 
[I]f this Court were convinced that plaintiff's organizers, by giving themselves special ad-
vertising rights, or by restricting the validation stamp system to certain businesses, were in 
fact primarily interested in their own ends rather than in those of the public, exemption 
under neither (c)(4) nor (c)(3) would be possible. 
389 F. Supp. at 975. Thus, the court rejected the evidence of private motive offered by the 
government, noting that the privileges were available to nonorganizers of the corporation as 
well as the organization that had arranged and financed the corporation. The court found: 
Plaintiff's organizers were also undeniably benefited. But this benefit is indistinguishable 
from that which inhered to the community as a whole. . . . 
Plaintiff has none of the indicia by which Courts have exposed bad faith attempts to take 
advantage of§ 501: no dividends for private persons, no under the table distributions of 
assets, no advertising advantages or special prices for a privileged few. The business ac-
tivity itself is similar to that which others engage in for private profit, but it is not carried 
on in the same manner; it is carried on only because it is necessary for the attainment of 
an undeniably public end. 
389 F. Supp. at 976, 977. But see Rev. Rul. 78-86, 1978-1 C.B. 152 (Service non-acquiescence 
in Monterey). 
For examples of cases where an examination of the objective evidence revealed self-inter-
est, see Ottawa Silica Co. v. United States, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9308, at 83780 (Ct. Cl. 
1982) (court found that benefits from a taxpayer's contribution of land ''were substantial 
enough to provide [taxpayer] with a quid pro quo for the transfer and thus effectively destroyed 
the charitable nature of the transfer."); Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. v. Commissioner, 79 
T.C. 793, 805 (1982) (copyright servicing center denied charitable status since "there is little 
persuasive evidence that petitioner's founders had interests of any substance beyond the crea-
tion of a device to protect their copyright ownership and collect license fees"). 
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way,77 derives from the legal meaning of "charity."78 Current law 
conditions classification as a social welfare or charitable organiza-
tion on some showing of benefit to the community.79 Under the ap-
proach proposed here, however, no attempt would be made to 
classify an entity as either a social welfare or charitable organization 
based on the amount of community benefits that it produced. so The 
community-benefit requirement suggested by this Note recognizes 
that benefits to the community cannot be quantified.81 Therefore, it 
simply requires some showing that the activity in question generates 
net social benefits as opposed to net social costs and, relatedly, does 
not operate for a purpose contrary to public policy.82 Groups that 
operated "for the promotion of social welfare"83 and satisfied this 
community-benefit requirement as well as the private-gain prohibi-
tion would qualify as social welfare organizations, and hence chari-
table organizations as well. 
The abolition of the distinction between charitable and social 
welfare organizations proposed here would not render subsection 
77. Note that the co=unity-benefit requirement is entirely distinct from the private-gain 
prohibition. See Christian Stewardship Assistance, Inc. v. Co=issioner, 70 T.C. 1037, 1042 
(1978) (rejecting contention that private purpose must be weighed against the public benefits 
derived therefrom; substantial private purpose alone disqualifies). q. Rev. Rul. 81-116, 1981-
1 C.B. 333 (parking facility that granted "participating merchants" special benefits was not 
operated exclusively for public purposes; it served participating merchants' private interests). 
The courts' treatment of charitable contributions also illustrates that the requirement of 
community benefit is not a factor in the private purpose determination. See, e.g., Ottawa Sil-
ica Co v. United States, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9308, at 83780 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (taxpayer 
denied charitable deduction for donation of land for a public high school where court found 
donation was made in anticipation of benefits to taxpayer from construction of school; "a 
contribution made to a charity is not made for public purposes if the donor receives, or antici-
pates receiving, a substantial benefit in return"). 
78. See notes 35-38 supra and accompanying text. 
79. See note 18 supra. 
80. See notes 18-19supra and accompanying text. Under the approach suggested here, the 
organization denied charitable status in Rev. Rul. 78-384, 1978-2 C.B. 174, discussed at note 19 
supra, would not be denied such status on the ground that it generated insufficient benefits to 
the co=unity, so long as it did produce co=unity benefits. The possibility exists, however, 
that this organization could still be denied charitable status through operation of the private-
gain prohibition. 
81. See notes 57-65 supra and accompanying text. 
82. "A corollary to the public benefit principle is the requirement, long recognized in the 
law of trusts, that the purpose of a charitable trust may not be illegal or violate established 
public policy .... (A]n institution must fall within a category specified ... and must demon-
strably serve and be in harmony with the public interest." Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 
103 S. Ct. 2017, 2028, 2029 (1983) (holding that universities with racially discriminatory admis-
sions policies may be denied charitable status). Where an organization is organized or oper-
ated for purposes contrary to public policy, the organization generates net social costs rather 
than net social benefits and should be denied charitable status. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-384, 
1975-2 C.B. 204 (peace organization that advocated civil disobedience to protest war denied 
charitable and social welfare status); Rev. Rul. 67-325, 1967-2 C.B. 113 (organization provid-
ing free recreational facilities but with race restriction denied charitable and social welfare 
status). 
83. I.R.C. § 50l(c)(4) (1982). 
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50l(c)(4) meaningless, however.84 Even if social welfare organiza-
tions were recognized as charitable under subsection 501(c)(3), sub-
section 50l(c)(4) would continue to exempt "action organizations" 
from taxation. "Action organizations" are social welfare organiza-
tions that attempt to influence legislation, 85 and therefore do not 
qualify for the tax exemption for charitable organizations provided 
by subsection 50l(c)(3).86 Thus, subsection 50l(c)(4) would continue 
to exempt some organizations not covered under 50l(c)(3), which 
may be its only congressionally recognized function. 87 In any event, 
the Service should not deny charitable status to social welfare orga-
nizations in hght of the ample evidence that Congress intended that 
they be included within the charitable category.88 
B. Advantages of the Proposal 
1. Elimination of Arbitrary Results 
Under the proposed approach, the Service and courts would em-
ploy two concepts, the private-gain prohibition and the community-
benefit requirement, that they already use in classifying social wel-
fare and charitable organizations.89 The proposed approach recog-
nizes, however, that all90 social welfare organizations should come 
under the category of charitable organizations as well. The distinc-
tion between the two types of organizations that the Service presum-
84. Courts should not construe a statute so that a section is not given effect. See Jarecki v. 
G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1961); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-
39 (1955). 
85. See Treas. Reg. §§ I.50I(c)(3)-l(c)(3), l.501(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(ii) (1959); see also note 4 
supra. 
86. See Treas. Reg. § l.50I(c)(3)-l(c)(3) (1959). 
87. Although it is unclear why Congress originally added the exemption for social welfare 
organizations contained in subsection 501(c)(4), see notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text, 
Congress has since clearly recognized the role of this provision in providing a tax exemption 
for action organizations, which cannot qualify for charitable status. See note 4 supra. This 
congressional recognition is apparent in the enactment of other Code provisions that limit the 
circumstances where action organizations may claim exemption under subsection 50I(c)(4). 
I.R.C. § 501(h) (1982) denies charitable status to organizations that make expenditures on 
political lobbying in excess of a certain amount. Further, I.R.C. § 504 (1982) prevents an 
organization that has lost its charitable exemption under subsection 501(c)(3) due to substan-
tial lobbying from thereafter claiming an exemption as a social welfare organization under 
subsection 501(c)(4). A 1976 Senate report discussing the addition of these provisions refers 
twice to the current regulations under subsection 50I(c)(4), which are discussed at note 4supra. 
See S. REP. No. 938 (Pt. II), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 n.l, 83, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4030, 4105, 4107-08. According to the report, Congress passed section 504 
to prevent a charitable organization from building up an endowment financed out of deducti-
ble contributions before operating as a lobbying organization under subsection 501(c)(4) 
(1976), an abuse that the prior regulations had allowed. See id. at 83, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. 
& AD. NEWS at 4107-08. 
88. See notes 29-41 supra and accompanying text. 
89. See notes 17-19, 69-70, & 77 supra and accompanying text. 
90. That is, except for "political" social welfare organizations, i.e., "action organizations." 
See notes 4 & 84-87 supra and accompanying text. 
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ably now makes on the basis of the amount of community benefits 
produced by each leads to arbitrary and unpredictable results in 
classification.91 Replacement of the Service's apparent quantification 
approach with a simple requirement that an organization's activities 
benefit the community would eliminate these arbitrary and unpre-
dictable results. 
2. Increase in the Social Advantages That Justify Deductible 
Contributions 
This Note's proposal would further the policies that led Congress 
to encourage the formation and conduct of charitable organizations. 
The existence of such organizations is considered desirable for two 
reasons. First, activities of charitable organizations generate benefits 
for the community. In the absence of these organizations, either the 
government would have to conduct these activities to generate such 
benefits or the community would go without them. Second, the 
existence of numerous private charitable organizations fosters plu-
ralism, widespread voluntary participation, and decentralized 
decisionmaking. 
Congress supports charitable organizations and helps realize 
these goals by exempting such organizations from taxation and al-
lowing donors to deduct contributions to such organizations. This 
government backing encourages the private sector to form additional 
charitable organizations or expand those already in existence. In 
either event, the result is that more charitable activities are con-
ducted by private organizations. To the extent that such activities 
had not been previously conducted, government support of charita-
ble organizations generates greater benefits for the community.92 
Moreover, charitable activities conducted by private organizations 
may displace a governmental agency that had provided similar serv-
91. See notes 57-65 supra and accompanying text. 
92. In a recent case, the Supreme Court noted that through making contributions to chari-
table organizations deductible, "Congress sought ... to encourage the development of private 
institutions that serve a useful public purpose or supplement or take the place of public institu-
tions of the same kind." Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2026 (1983); see 
also M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 8, ~ 7.01, at 142 ("[I]t might be expected that, unless deducti-
ble, charitable gifts would shrink to offset a portion of the donor's tax liabilities, and the scope 
of philanthropic activities would necessarily contract."). With respect to tax exemptions for 
charitable organizations, the Court observed: "Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis 
that the exempt entity confers a public benefit - a benefit which the society or the community 
may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which supplements and advances the work of 
public institutions already supported by tax revenues." 103 S. Ct. at 2028. 
In addition, a congressional report discussing the deduction provision noted that "the Gov-
ernment is compensated for the loss of [tax] revenue by its relief from financial burden which 
would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the promotion of 
the general welfare." H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938). 
See also Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924); St. Louis 
Union Trust Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 427, 432 (8th Cir. 1967). 
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ices.93 In these ways, government support of charitable organiza-
tions through the tax law fosters pluralism, voluntarism, and 
decentralized decisionmaking.94 
Any organization that satisfies the two criteria for charitable sta-
tus proposed by this Note would further these policies. First, the 
private-gain prohibition ensures that charitable organizations con-
duct activities that the private sector might not otherwise provide. If 
an activity is sufficiently profitable to induce persons to engage in it 
without government support, the private-gain prohibition should 
prevent an organization conducting that activity from attaining char-
itable status.95 The private-gain prohibition thus focuses the govern-
ment support provided by the tax law on those organizations that 
might not exist without it, and in this way encourages diversity and 
voluntary participation.96 Second, the community-benefit require-
ment motivates organizations to respond to the particular needs of a 
community.97 This criterion thereby inspires innovative, decentral-
93. See note 92 supra. In addition, Hopkins notes: 
Clearly then, the exemption for charitable organizations is a derivative of the concept that 
they perform functions which, in the organizations' absence, government would have to 
perform; therefore, government is willing to forego the otherwise tax revenues in return 
for the public services rendered. 
B. HOPKINS, supra note l, at 5. Recently, Congress expressed a similar sentiment when it 
explained its passage of the charitable deduction for non-itemizers contained in I.R.C. § 170(i) 
(1982): 
The Congress believed that allowing a charitable deduction to nonitemizers stimulates 
charitable giving, thereby providing more funds for worthwhile nonprofit organizations, 
many of which provide services that otherwise might have to be provided by the Federal 
Government. 
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981 at 49 (Comm. Print 1981), reprinted in 1980-1981 
INTERNAL REVENUE Acrs, at 1369, 1423 (1982). 
94. In his concurring opinion in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983), 
Justice Powell alluded to "the important role played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, 
indeed often sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints." 103 S. Ct. at 2038 (Powell, J., con-
curring). "[T]he provision of tax exemptions to nonprofit groups is one indispensable means of 
limiting the influence of governmental orthodoxy on important areas of community life." 103 
S. Ct. at 2038 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). See also B. HOPKINS,supra note l, at 
6-8; Rainey & Henshaw, supra note 13, at 240 (Private decisionmaking provides "innovative, 
creative, involvement in areas as yet too sensitive for government exploration."). Specifically, 
Hopkins observes: 
Charitable organizations are regarded as fostering voluntarism and pluralism in the 
American social order. That is, society is regarded as benefiting not only from the applica-
tion of private wealth to specific purposes in the public interest but also from the variety 
of choices made by individual philanthropists as to which activities to further. This de-
centralized choice-making is arguably more efficient and responsive to public needs than 
the cumbersome and less flexible allocation process of government administration. 
B. HOPKINS, supra note l, at 7 (citations omitted). 
95. See notes 68-73 supra and accompanying text. 
96. See notes 92-94 supra and accompanying text. 
97. For example, the tax breaks afforded by charitable status may encourage the formation 
of a credit counseling service that, among other activities, provides aid to the non-poor. See 
Consumer Credit Counseling Serv., Inc. v. United States, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9660 
(D.D.C. 1978). The court here held that a credit counseling service was charitable. The Serv-
ice had considered this activity worthy only of social welfare status. See Rev. Rul. 65-299, 
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ized decisionmaking, and enhances the prospects for pluralistic input 
in addressing a community's problems. 
Because the approach advocated by this Note recognizes social 
welfare organizations as charitable, greater community benefits 
would flow from activities encouraged by the deductibility of chari-
table contributions.98 Since social welfare organizations satisfy the 
private-gain prohibition99 and meet the community-benefit test even 
under the fUITent approach apparently followed by the Service, 100 
their existence serves the goals of pluralism, voluntarism, and decen-
tralized decisionmaking like that of any charitable organization. 101 
By denying social welfare organizations charitable status, the Service 
causes the public to forgo the additional benefits that social welfare 
organizations as a whole would produce if they, like charitable orga-
nizations, could receive deductible contributions. Extension of the 
deduction provision to social welfare organizations would result in 
the expansion of these organizations' current activities or lead to the 
formation of new social welfare organizations. This Note's proposal 
seeks to provide communities with the additional benefits that 
greater social welfare organization activity would generate by grant-
ing. such organizations charitable status and thus making them eligi-
ble to receive deductible contributions. 
Finally, the proposal set forth here should guarantee that only 
those organizations for which deductibility is appropriate would 
qualify as charitable. The private-gain prohibition would continue 
to exclude from charitable status those organizations that conduct 
activities for private benefit. Among the organizations disqualified 
from charitable status by the private-gain prohibition are many that 
subsection 50l(c) already exempts from taxation, such as business 
leagues, 102 labor organizations, 103 and social clubs. 104 Although Con-
gress has granted tax exemptions to these organizations, such exemp-
tions rest on policies different from the reasons underlying tax 
exemption and deductible contributions for charitable organiza-
tions.105 Making contributions to non-charitable organizations de-
1965-2 C.B. 165. For further illustrations of the variety of community services that charitable 
status may inspire, see the rulings cited in notes 14-16 supra. 
Hopkins notes the similar policy behind the charitable and social welfare exemptions: both 
tax relief measures are granted in recognition of community benefit. See B. HOPKINS, supra 
note 1, at 5-14. 
98. See notes 92-93 supra and accompanying text. 
99. See note 17 supra and accompanying text. 
100. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text. 
101. See note 94 supra and accompanying text. 
102. See I.R.C. § 50l(c)(6} (1982). 
103. See I.R.C. § 50l(c)(5} (1982). 
104. See I.R.C. § 50l(c)(7} (1982). 
105. Charitable and social welfare organizations, exempt from taxation under subsections 
50l(c)(3) and (4), are both "public service" organizations. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 
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ductible is not necessary to encourage the operation of such 
organizations, even though their activities may be beneficial to the 
community. Sufficient private incentive already exists to encourage 
the operation of such organizations, and further government support 
through the tax law would be a windfall. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite opposition from the courts, the Service continues to dis-
tinguish between charitable and social welfare organizations under 
subsections 501(c)(3) and (4) of the Code. An examination of the 
legislative history of the statutory predecessors of these current pro-
visions, however, reveals that the separate enumeration of the two 
organizations was not intended to exclude social welfare organiza-
tions from the charitable category. Moreover, the Service's attempts 
to draw such a distinction have failed, leading to arbitrary and un-
predictable outcomes in classification. Therefore, the Service should 
recognize social welfare organizations as cha.ritable, since such orga-
nizations, like charitable organizations, by definition do not operate 
for private gain and do benefit the community in some way. This 
approach would eliminate the unhappy results now produced by the 
Service's attempts to distinguish between social welfare and charita-
ble organizations, and would further the policies of pluralism, volun-
8, at 305. These public service organizations are distinct from other organizations exempted 
from taxation under subsection 50l(c), such as business leagues, labor organizations, and so-
cial clubs, which are termed "mutual benefit" organizations. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra 
note 8, at 306; see also Rev. Rul. 75-199, 1975-1 C.B. 160 (social welfare organizations distin-
guished from mutual benefit organizations). 
Public service organizations "serve the interests of society in a broad sense, ordinarily with-
out economic benefit to their organizers or benefactors." Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 8, at 
302. They are exempt from income taxation because they "do not realize 'income' in the ordi-
nary sense of that term[,] [so] there is no satisfactory way to fit the tax rate to the ability of the 
beneficiaries to pay." Id at 305. The category of public service organizations includes only 
subsection 50l(c)(3) charitable organizations and subsection 50l(c)(4) social welfare organiza-
tions and political parties. See id. at 305. 
Mutual benefit organizations, unlike public service organizations, operate primarily for the 
economic benefit of their members. These organizations "are 'nonprofit' only in the lim-
ited sense that they do not engage in business with the general public for the benefit of inves-
tors" in the organization. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 8, at 302 (footnote omitted). Thus, the 
private-gain prohibition does not apply to mutual benefit organizations. See note 68 supra. As 
a result, mutual benefit organizations, unlike public service organizations, do not further the 
tax policies underlying deductible contributions. See notes 95-96 supra and accompanying 
text. The benefits provided to the members of such an organization provide sufficient incen-
tive for the operation of the organization, so deductible contributions are not necessary to the 
organization's continued existence. Thus, this Note recognizes that mutual benefit organiza-
tions should not be eligible for deductible contributions. In addition, tax exemption for these 
organizations is grounded on considerations different from those underlying exemption of 
public service organizations. For an explanation of these considerations, see Bittker & 
Rahdert, supra note 8, at 348-55; B. HOPKINS, supra note 1, at 14-15. 
For some examples of mutual benefit organizations, see Rev. Rul. 74-553, 1974-2 C.B. 168 
(medical association peer review board qualifies as subsection 50l(c)(6) business league); Rev. 
Rul. 69-632, 1969-2 C.B. 120 (industry research association qualifies as subsection 50l(c)(6) 
business league). 
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tarism, and decentralized decisionmaking encouraged by the special 
tax advantages accorded charitable organizations. 
